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The assumption underlying this symposium betrays an unusual transformation of atti- 
tude and an uncharacteristic openmindedness, in that it holds that philosophers of sci- 
ence can learn something from historians of science. Philosophers of science used to re- 
gard historians as rather dull witted. But attitudes have changed, and for fair reason. A 
judicious assessment of the two disciplines in the last decade or so would suggest that 
many of the interesting philosophical questions have flowed from history. As I will 
argue in a moment, this is exactly what one should expect. We might well ask, of 
course, whether historians can learn something from philosophers of science. To answer 
either of these questions requires, first, a consideration of the asymmetrical relations be- 
tween the two. In toting up these asymmetries, I will sometimes count scientists who 
write on their own history with philosophers of science, since their sins are common. 
A glaring asymmetry, obvious at this meeting, is that historians dress better than 
philosophers-historians always being interested in the details, sartorial and other- 
wise, while philosophers seem concerned only with dressing in general. Beneath 
what may seem a rather superficial difference, though, lies their principal and diver- 
gent intellectual trajectories. Historians spend their time worrying about the details: 
the dates, the places, the specific contexts of ideas, discoveries, experiments, and 
claims. For philosophers, on the other hand, it's the generalizable character of the 
events; they rip ideas, discoveries, and experiments untimely out of context so as to 
generalize from them, to make them representative of a larger class, to assess the mer- 
its of their claims in terms of more abstract norms, and to trace out their implications. 
Of course, the historian does occasionally lift an eye toward the universal, just as the 
philosopher will stumble across this or that nasty little fact. 
Another asymmetry concerns the kind of training of each. Historians, aside from 
learning the general go of the history of science, or at least of the particular science or 
period in which they will do research, spend no little time acquiring special skills, pale- 
ography and languages in particular, or perhaps an antiquated mathematics. Historians 
do this in order to understand the science and the age in context. Historians as well at- 
tempt to trace back published works to their origins in the notebooks kept, the letters 
written, and the books read; and languages are necessary for this. Philosophers, aside 
from reading the classics in their areas of concern and the secondary literature, do 
PSA 1992, Volume 2, pp. 482-489 
Copyright ? 1993 by the Philosophy of Science Association 
483 
worry about their main tool as well. The question, for the philosopher, though, is not 
"Do I know this language?" but "Am I smart?" The historian of science works with 
things-letters, notebooks, papers, even ancient experimental apparatus-and tries to 
make them yield a set of causal conditions that render a particular scientific discovery, 
formulation, or claim understandable. The philosopher works with abstractions-the 
nature of theory, observation, hypothesis, explanation-and a clever mind is required to 
understand those relationships. But therein lies, in the historian's estimation, an invita- 
tion to tragedy and possibilities of great sorrow. 
In Rome, Edward Gibbon, while he sat musing on the ruins of the Capital, re- 
solved to write his Decline and Fall as he listened to the barefooted friars chanting in 
what was once the temple of Jupiter (1984, p. 143). Gibbon wept, as many a historian 
has when contemplating the ruin philosophical mendicants have visited upon the past, 
precisely because of their devotion to the universal. Not even Virgil could discover 
that pit beyond the circle of treachery into which historians would cast unregenerate 
philosophers and scientists for the unpardonable sin, that of presentism: reading pre- 
sent concerns and ideas back into the past. The inclination to generalize for all times 
and places-say, the nature of theory, or the causes of theory change-easily leads 
one to believe that the logic of present science was also that of science past. Steve 
Gould, for the moment an honorary philosopher, persists in interpreting Darwin's the- 
ory as rejecting progress. "The summum bonum of Charles Darwin's world is sur- 
vival and persistence, not progress or improvement," he writes recently (1992, p. 
165), as he has before (1977, p. 45). Only a steady eye on contemporary neo- 
Darwinism could produce such a universalizing judgment. Needless to say, Darwin 
was not a neo-Darwinian, a surprisingly controverted thesis, which one recent book 
has definitively argued, with, I think, complete persuasive effect (Richards, 1992a), 
and another, which surveys the idea of progress from the nineteenth century to the 
present, Michael Ruse's current endeavor (forthcoming), will show, if wise, that thesis 
to be not only an acceptable analytic proposition but one historically supportable. 
Beneath the asymmetry of particularity and universality lies a more subtle one: it 
concerns the engine that makes the research and writing take off. Two colleagues of 
mine at the University of Chicago, Leonard Linsky-an analytic philosopher-and 
William McNei-world historian (in both senses of that phrase)-had, a while ago, a 
sabbatical during the same year. It happens that they live next to one another in Hyde 
Park. In the late spring, McNeil asked Linsky how his work was going. Linsky said dur- 
ing his whole sabbatical he hadn't done a thing. He just couldn't get the ideas to come 
out. McNeil was nonpluszed. He couldn't understand the difficulty. During his year's 
leave, he had drafted a substantial book. As an historian, you do your research-read 
primary and secondary literature, go to archives-and then you arrange your notes and sit 
down and write. The history is out there; you simply must capture it on paper. 
Now this, of course, is a bit too simple a view of the historian's task, but it does 
highlight the difference of subjects and how the traditional practitioners of the two 
disciplines conceive their goals. The philosopher must create certain ideas, and put 
them together, which on the surface seems the easier job but often turns out to be 
rather difficult. The historian, in a certain sense, finds ideas ready made; most of them 
lie in documents, or are derivable from documents. He or she must, of course, dis- 
cover them, isolate them, and then reset them in their appropriate context. Even the 
poor historian will sometimes produce something of interest, usually a description of 
a hitherto unknown document or, perhaps, a story of an event or set of relationships 
not before recognized. The poor philosopher, almost by definition, never produces 
anything of interest; for a poor philosopher's ideas do not mesh; his or her theory be- 
comes swiss cheese as counter-examples are propelled into it. 
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The task of the good historian, however, is more difficult than that of even the 
good philosopher. It's simply harder being a good historian than a good philosopher. 
There are two principal reasons for this, I believe. First, the philosopher works with 
constructed ideas, and thus he or she can mold the ideas and establish their connec- 
tions while worrying, for the most part, only about transgressing the principles of 
logic; the connection of these ideas with the empirical world is not a primary 
issue-and, after all, if observations are permeated by theory, then the empirical 
world becomes rather like silly putty in the hands of a dexterous philosopher. The 
good philosopher of science tests his or her conceptions, not usually against the given, 
messy particulars of scientific practice but against the rational reconstruction of that 
practice, which rational reconstruction tends to be, perhaps not surprisingly, awfully 
friendly to the concepts being tested. The good historian, by contrast, must be cre- 
ative in a medium-namely the past with its jagged contours, unforgiving heights, 
and obscure depths-that allows only the most creative of minds to make something 
of it anew. The historian would like to tell the story one way, but the material will not 
support it. The story he or she wishes to tell logically could have happened in the de- 
sired way; but the facts run against the grain of the narrative. Like Michelangelo, the 
historian has to make the David come out of just this piece of Carrara marble. The 
historian must sculpt with care and ingenuity, for the fracture lines of the medium will 
reduce to dust many a possible narrative. 
The second reason for the difficulty facing the good historian concerns the mode 
of expression. Historians who will do important work must heed the prayerful verse 
of Charles Kingsley over his daughter. He said: "Be good, sweet maid, and let who 
will be clever." The good historian, though, will also be clever, as able and as dexter- 
ous with a concept as any philosopher. But the historian must do more to be good. 
He or she must capture the past in an arresting narrative, a compelling story that drags 
the reader in. Boring histories are written by boring historians, generally poor histori- 
ans. The good historian will not tell a boring tale. He or she will make it come alive 
using all the techniques known to good novelists and even poets. And history is 
served by this. Since what will be conveyed by the good historian is not simply a 
sepia-toned picture of the past, but a living, moving picture-one that does not merely 
describe emotions and attitudes, but recreates them, engenders them in the reader. An 
essential task of the historian, I believe, is to recreate the past on the page, so that mo- 
tivations, feelings, loves, and hates will emotionally move the reader to understand 
how the actors could make certain decisions and take certain steps. Of course, the 
historian of science will attempt to display the material logic of a set of ideas that 
would explain an actor's behavior; but rarely will cold ideas alone provide the steam 
necessary to motivate an action. David Hume, the great Tudor-Stuart historian, was 
right when he said reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions. For the histori- 
an to unspring those passions on the page, to make the reader feel them, will simulta- 
neously help explain the behavior in question. And that is the most difficult task of 
the good historian-to make the history come imaginatively alive, to recreate in the 
minds of the readers the motivational context of past science, but yet to have the his- 
torian's imagination constrained by and that recreation held within the bounds of what 
can be demonstrated, proved, or at least supported by the facts. Thomas Babbington 
Macaulay, the great nineteenth-century British historian, put it thus: 
A perfect historian must possess an imagination sufficiently powerful to make his 
narrative affecting and picturesque. Yet he must control it so absolutely as to con- 
tent himself with the materials which he finds, and to refrain from supplying defi- 
ciencies by additions of his own. He must be a profound and ingenious reasoner. 
Yet he must possess sufficient self-command to abstain from casting his facts in 
the mould of his hypothesis (1828, pp. 1-2). 
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Macaulay mentions the source of a chief complaint historians have about philoso- 
phers: the use of historical cases as exemplars molded in the form of whatever hypoth- 
esis the philosopher is advancing. The cases become factoids used to demonstrate the 
hypothesis, and they are synthesized into smooth little nuggets just for the purpose. 
Now, I don't wish to suggest that historians do not formulate theories and test hy- 
potheses. They do. But the theories and hypotheses are usually of a very low level, 
and they arise most often out of the research itself. If further research does not sup- 
port them, then the historian will usually abandon those theories without, however, 
being required to abandon the particular history he or she is writing. When a philo- 
sophical theory is undermined, well the beast should die on the spot. Rarely does that 
happen, of course. You can never quite tell when a philosophical theory has died; it 
seems embalmed from the beginning so as to prevent rot. Historical theories act more 
responsibly. When confronted with lethal evidence, which is most often of a harder, 
more factual sort, they usually give up the ghost. 
Though there are many other asymmetries that characterize the relationships of 
these disciplines, let me mention perhaps the most important one. And that is: decent 
history of science can survive without philosophy of science, but philosophy of sci- 
ence, by the logic of its own discipline, absolutely requires the aid of history of sci- 
ence. Historians can take the meaning of theory, hypothesis, observation, explana- 
tion, and so on from the historical events themselves-Darwin, for instance, used all 
of these notions-of theory, hypothesis, etc.-and his efforts exemplified them. Here 
is the source of their meaning for the historian. He or she need not repair to the 
philosopher for an authenticated concept to employ. The philosopher of science, on 
the other hand, will be engaged in arguing for a particular conception, say, of scientif- 
ic explanation. Ultimately he or she can justify that conception only by appeal to suc- 
cessful explanations in science-that is, of necessity, to some past bit of science to 
justify his or her position. What is the alternative-metaphysical or epistemological 
intuition? Certainly one can formulate a priori a model of explanation, but to advance 
it as the model of scientific explanation, or even explanation in, say, biology, requires 
the philosopher to justify it against actual examples of explanations that have been 
used in science-and history is needed for that. 
Of course, philosophers of science, especially those writing today, attempt precise- 
ly this sort of justification. They most often do test their models by appeal to histori- 
cal examples. Usually, however, the historical episodes, appropriately sanitized, serve 
only as examples. Consider, for instance, the efforts of Michael Ghiselin, Michael 
Ruse, and Philip Kitcher--their efforts to uncover the explanatory structure of 
Darwin's theory. Ghiselin, in his Triumph of the Darwinian Method (1969, p. 129), 
discovers that method to be the hypothetical deductive method, as refined by philoso- 
phers in the late twentieth century. Michael Ruse-that is, a younger, greener, less 
historically seasoned Michael Ruse-suggests much the same in his Darwin 
Revolution (1979). More recently, Philip Kitcher, in a longish article in Minnesota 
Studies (1989) worked out a theory of explanation in which the systematic unification 
provided by theory bears the explanatory power. He had written, shortly before, an- 
other article (1985), ostensibly more historical in character, on the argument strategy 
of Darwin's Origin of Species (1859). The historical analysis of that Darwin piece 
led, not surprisingly, to the conclusion that Darwin had adopted a Kitcherian view of 
explanation. Since Kitcher's notions about systematic unification are amorphous 
enough not to impose a heavy theoretical burden on his historical analysis, the dam- 
age to the history is not extensive-along the way he actually says some very acute 
things, things that challenge ordinary readings. Using Kitcher's account, let me men- 
tion what I take to be the distinguishing features of a philosopher's approach to histor- 
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ical analysis. I could have used Michael Ruse as the example, but, as Justice Holmes 
remarked, great cases like hard cases make bad law. 
Kitcher's analysis requires him to suggest that Darwin's main accomplishment 
was to advance certain questions about geographical distribution, variation, and unity 
of type as central questions of biology. Kitcher claims that such questions were, up to 
Darwin's time, deemed impossible of answer since their resolution could be found 
only within the bosom of the Deity-they admitted only a vague theological account, 
and not a scientific one. So that Darwin's main accomplishment, according to 
Kitcher, was to show that such questions were important scientific questions, and their 
scientificity was demonstrated by the systematic answers Darwin could advance 
(1985, pp. 146-47). Kitcher's analysis supposes, but does not historically show, that 
such questions as geographical distribution, unity of type, and variation had not been 
given systematic treatment prior to Darwin. But any historian of biology would rec- 
ognize these and other like questions Darwin handles as central to the concerns of his 
predecessors; these were questions that had been given several systematically related 
answers. (Charles Lyell, of course, considered in depth the "laws which regulate the 
geographical distribution of species" [1832, pp. 66-175], as well as "variability of a 
species" [1832, pp. 18-65] and unity of type [1832, pp. 62-5].) Moreover, the con- 
trast between theological answers and scientific ones stands as sharply defined today 
as it was befogged in the mid-nineteenth century. A measure of this lack of separa- 
tion between what we think of as science and what theology can be discerned in the 
Origin itself, which proposes a broad theological framework within which to under- 
stand the operations of evolution by natural selection. Indeed, it is hard to understand 
Darwin's conception of natural selection, or the explanatory power it had with many 
of his readers, without historically contextualizing it and recovering its status as a fun- 
damentally theological concept (see Richards, forthcoming). 
More problematic and more representative are Kitcher's assumptions about theo- 
retical explanation and his use of history to confirm those assumptions. Kitcher and 
other philosophers who have tried to determine the explanatory logic of Darwin's the- 
ory, especially as represented in the Origin of Species, have assumed, or I would say, 
have imposed, on the argument of the Origin, a simple, logically unified, and system- 
atically related structure-the model of which is Hempel's nomological-deductive 
scheme. The assumption, then, is that the phrase "Darwin's theory" names such a sta- 
ble, logically tight structure that underlies its various expressions-expressions which 
evince the structure after a suitable "rational reconstruction." The historian, however, 
implicitly recognizes theories in science as historical entities whose parts are not 
bound together by the silver threads of logic, but by baser ties of causal contingency 
and changing selective forces. The historian will understand Darwin's theory to have 
continued to evolve from first conception through final edition of the Origin. The 
various changing parts of the theory will have shifting relations to other parts and the 
evidence specified. Further the explanatory power will reside as much in the 
metaphors employed, the background beliefs of the readers, and their familiarity with 
the evidence (see Richards 1992b). Several of Darwin's readers were compelled by 
the theological character of natural selection, a powerfully persuasive feature that has 
gone completely anemic in modern times. 
These two ways of regarding theory, the philosopher's and the historian's, mark 
their general intellectual tendencies-the philosopher scouting after the stable, un- 
changing, and universal, the historian after the contingent, fleeting, and particular. 
Ever has it been thus. 
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Equally problematic, to return to Kitcher's analysis, is the modus operandi in his 
use of history, which is typically that of the philosopher of science. As with most 
philosophical analyses of explanation, Kitcher's model doesn't flow from the histori- 
cal analysis, but is imposed upon the history; the historical analysis becomes the de- 
ductive conclusion from the model. The model itself, in Kitcher's case, is shaped 
more against the contrary model of Hempel and the objections formulated against the 
nomological-deductive type of explanation, objections now schooling as numerous as 
the alewives off the shores of Lake Michigan. The result of Kitcher's Darwinian ex- 
ercise-and here I let it stand for many similar efforts by philosophers who have 
made a conscientious attempt to employ extended historical examples-Kitcher's 
analysis exhibits the burden of philosophy on history, or in Macauley's terms, it re- 
veals too much the casting of facts in the mold of the hypothesis. And this will al- 
ways be the deep suspicion that historians have about philosophers, till those philoso- 
phers themselves become historians. 
These objections from the historian's point of view should not be taken to deny the 
power and interest of Kitcher's analyses, or those of other philosophers, the young 
Michael Ruse, for instance. Concerning Kitcher's and Ruse's efforts, one might adapt 
the line Ronald Knox chose for own epitaph: Their sins were scarlet but their books 
were read. 
I've argued that decent history of science can get along quite nicely without the in- 
terference of philosophy of science. Certainly most Ph. D. programs in history of sci- 
ence at various universities, here and abroad, confirm that assumption. And in some 
notable instances, the attempted marriage of history and philosophy of science in the 
same department has demonstrated the instability of such unions. It is a dreary con- 
clusion from this observation, but amply supported by the evidence, that history of 
science remains sublimely indifferent, if not hostile, to philosophy of science. 
For the historian to practice simply decent history of science can hardly be an ex- 
alted goal. Good history of science, which ought to be the goal, cannot often be exe- 
cuted, I think, without the aid of those conceptions honed by philosophers of science. 
Good history of science will not simply offer penetrating analyses of the context of 
particular episodes, but it will extend those considerations, generalize them, make an 
argument about the nature of the episodes or of science during particular periods. The 
historian can accomplish this only by critically considering such things as, for in- 
stance, the nature of explanation or the causes of theory change or theory acceptance. 
Historians fall into uncritical and debilitating confusion when they utilize unreflected- 
upon categories, arguing in innocence of the kinds of analyses that philosophers have 
undertaken. In Leviathan and the Air Pump (1985), for example-now to knock 
those in the history trade-Shapin and Schaffer would have been more hesitant in ad- 
vancing an argument that teetered so precariously on the unstable Wittegensteinian 
concept of "form of life" had they read, say, Donald Davidson's "On the Very Idea of 
a Conceptual Scheme" (1974). From the philosopher's point of view, they could have 
spent more time reading Hobbes, as well. 
Now having argued the asymmetries between philosophy of science and histo- 
ry of science-in the mode, it will not have escaped your notice, of a philosopher who 
has dealt more in stereotypes and ideal cases-can my conclusion be anything other 
than the trite one that philosophers of science must become knowledgeable in the his- 
tory of science. Well, I'll dare to be trite, and say it's at least that. But I think more 
has to be demanded of philosophers of science-if they wish to do philosophy in the 
most complete way. They must be trained in history of science, after the manner of 
historians. Sometimes philosophers will read assiduously the secondary literature of 
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history of science-but this is not enough; it's certainly not the way historians them- 
selves become trained. At other times, philosophers will focus on the primary litera- 
ture-say the Origin of Species. But this too is insufficient. They must read both sec- 
ondary literature and primary literature simultaneously. Moreover, they must needs 
trace sources back to their origins in notebooks, letters, and unpublished papers. In 
short, they must become credible historians. Such immersion in the history will pro- 
vide those originating ideas that perhaps can be generalized in striking and exciting 
ways, in ways some at this session have already accomplished. And my critical re- 
marks are not meant to demean any of those efforts of the several here who alternately 
pass as philosophers and historians. 
If philosophers undertake training of this kind, and, as befits their species, reflect 
on the new realities, they will come, I think, to the same assumption that guides most 
historians. It is an assumption historians harbor but would not fain articulate, lest 
they sound too much like philosophers. This is the general thesis that theories in sci- 
ence are historical entities, not abstract forms dwelling in a Popperian third world. 
They evolve over time and thus can sustain only short term generalizations. If that is 
true, then the entangling relationships of theory with explanation, observation, justifi- 
cation, and transformation will also be recognized as historical. Such historicization 
will, in those of proper disposition, curb the overwrought generalizing tendency that 
suffuses philosophy of science, and allow its practitioners more easily to heed 
Macaulay's injunction not to cast one's facts in the mold of a favored hypothesis. 
Historians, who wish to be good and ply their trade in more than the conventional 
ways, must also accommodate themselves to their opposite numbers. They must train 
in the argument styles and become apprised of the literature in philosophy. Until 
philosophers become historians or historians philosophers, neither the philosophy of 
science nor the history of science will be well served. 
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